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Abstract
We bridge current streams of innovation research to explore the interplay between
R&D, external knowledge, and organizational structurethree elements of a rms inno-
vation strategy which we argue should logically be studied together. Using within-rm
patent assignment patterns, we develop a novel measure of structure for a large sample of
American rms. We nd that centralized rms invest more in research and patent more
per R&D dollar than decentralized rms. Both types access technology via mergers and
acquisitions, but their acquisitions di¤er in terms of frequency, size, and integration. Con-
sistent with our framework, their sources of value creation di¤er: while centralized rms
derive more value from internal R&D, decentralized rms rely more on external knowl-
edge. We discuss how these ndings should stimulate more integrative work on theories of
innovation.
Keywords: decentralization, organizational structure, mergers and acquisitions, patents,
R&D, market value
JEL Classication: D23 D83 L22
1 Introduction
How do rms allocate resources between R&D and external technology in order to maximize
value and drive growth? And in turn, do their ensuing growth trajectories themselves shape
such future resource allocation? Over the past three decades, the eld of innovation strategy
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has isolated a set of important dyadic relationships in an e¤ort to understand these interrelated
questions. For example, a substantial body of work has advanced our understanding of the
relationship between internal R&D and external knowledge, (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Pisano, 1990; Katz and Allen, 1982). More recently, a small literature on the structure of R&D
has explored how the resource allocation decision is related to the centralization or decentraliza-
tion of R&D (e.g. Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Lerner and Wulf, 2007). Separately, work on
structural integration and resource reconguration has looked at how organizations are shaped
by acquisitions and absorption (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006;
Karim and Mitchell, 2000).
Surprisingly, there remains little integration of the aforementioned streams. This lack of
synthesis may be due to data constrains, since most work that considers such organizational
dynamics tends to rely on small samples (Karim and Mitchell, 2004, and Cohen and Levinthal,
1990 are notable exceptions). Understandably, researchers must often cede the pursuit of a richer
understanding of strategic interrelationships in exchange for "analytical precision and theoretical
rigor" (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Nonetheless, this lacuna is an important and understudied
limitation, since the very word "organization"from the Greek organon ("tool, instrument, set
of rules")denotes a coherent system or unit where interdependent parts work as one. In fact,
a central tenet of organization theory holds that the structures, systems, and processes of a rm
should be interdependent and must be mutually supportive and coherent (Drazin and Van de
Ven, 1985; Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow, 2011).
It is the pursuit of this coherence logic that motivates our paper. Using a novel large-
scale dataset, we explore whether rms demonstrate distinct and coherent combinations of
R&D organizational structure and knowledge-sourcing strategies, as would be expected given
the concatenated predictions of these emerging theories of innovation. We propose that rms
pursuing a particular approach to innovation (e.g., a strong focus on internal research like
IBM or an "acquire and develop" approach like Cisco) also need a well-matched supporting
organizational structure (e.g., centralized or decentralized). Empirically, we exploit a sample
that includes nearly all patenting public American rms, and develop a new measure of R&D
organizational structure which uses the ratio of patents assigned to a¢ liates versus corporate
parents as a proxy for the decentralization of R&D. This involves matching 576,052 patents
to 1,014 publicly traded American corporations and their 2,768 a¢ liates. By documenting the
types of choices that rms make, we bridge streams of the literature that have previously studied
dyadic relationships between internal and external knowledge sourcing, between organizational
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structure and innovation, and between acquisitions and structure.
Our ndings extend and clarify prior results. We nd evidence that strongly supports the
coherence logic. Knowledge sourcing strategies appear to be systematically related to orga-
nizational structure. Moreover, the market valuation of these knowledge sourcing strategies
strongly correlates with structure. We nd conrmatory large-scale evidence that research-
oriented rms are signicantly more centralized than others, consistent with earlier small-sample
ndings (Hoskisson, et al. 1993; Kay, 1988; Argyres and Silverman, 2004). But we also nd
that organizational structure seems to strongly condition the relationship between rms re-
search focus and their external knowledge acquisition strategy. Though both centralized and
decentralized rms acquire external technology, centralized rms do so less frequently and tend
to make smaller acquisitions. Moreover, they manage acquisitions di¤erently. Acquisitions by
centralized rms frequently undergo full structural integration (Puranam et al., 2006), whereas
decentralized rms tend to keep acquisitions as discrete entities.
Importantly, the logic underlying these patterns of choice is reected in measurable di¤er-
ences in the composition of rmsmarket value. Whereas centralized rms draw most of their
intangible value from internal R&D stocks, decentralized rms derive relatively more value
from externally acquired patents. This nding is especially strong for large rms and rms with
higher technological diversity.
Our results imply that a successful innovation strategy requires careful alignment both be-
tween internal and external knowledge sourcing, and between the internal/external mix of inputs
and organizational structure. The implied coherence, however, does not necessarily imply a par-
ticular causal structure. Establishing causality is important, but given the nature of our data,
it is beyond the scope of our project. Furthermore, it is just as important to develop a fuller
theory of innovation that accounts for the dynamics we highlight in this study. By developing a
new empirical measure and systematically exposing the relationships between internal research,
external knowledge, and organizational structure among a nearly comprehensive set of rms,
we take an important step towards the development of such theory.
2 Three Pillars of Innovation Strategy
We draw upon important streams in the innovation literature that have explored dyadic relation-
ships between research, external knowledge and structure. The rst explores how the nature of
research inside a rm is related to how the activity itself is organized. Firms that invest heavily
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in basic research have been shown to have more centralized R&D, whereas decentralized R&D,
managed by business units and divisions, tends to be more applied and incremental (Argyres
and Silverman, 2004). This association is theorized to be driven by a t between function and
structure, as research is often managed through a centralized organization to exploit economies
of scale and scope. By contrast, development is often managed in business units, closer to where
it will be applied (Kay, 1988), arguably because often business unit managers are more likely
to favor investments that are closely tied to existing products than large research projects with
uncertain payo¤s (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Lerner and Wulf, 2007). In sum, we would expect
rms that conduct basic research to typically centralize R&D, whereas decentralized rms are
less likely to invest in basic research.
Our data allows us to explore whether this relationship, which had previously been shown
in small sample studies, also holds in our comprehensive sample. But missing from this lit-
erature is an in-depth treatment of the logical consequences that such patterns would imply:
If decentralized rms are less likely to conduct basic research themselves, are they also more
reliant upon external technology for growth? If so, do decentralized rms approach acquisitions
di¤erently? And how much of this di¤erence is the result of organizational structure, and how
much the result of di¤erences in the type of R&D they perform? Though Argyres and Silver-
man (2004) hint at this issue by exploring how structure conditions a rms propensity to "build
on. . . innovations developed outside," they conceptualize external search in terms of how much
the rm cites external patents, but ignore acquisition of external knowledge via mechanisms
that can have feedback e¤ects on structure, like M&A.
Thus, to probe these questions further, we look to the second literature, which explores how
and why rms access external knowledge. Internal research helps rms identify, evaluate, and
assimilate external knowledge (Rosenberg, 1979; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), which often comes
via acquisitions (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Fleming, 2001). But while many have interpreted
absorptive capacity to imply that internal research should lead to a more e¢ cient acquisition
of external knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994), others have argued that investments in
internal research may actually bias rms against external knowledge (Katz and Allen, 1982),
and that acquisitions may reduce resources and incentives for internal research (Hitt, et al.,
1990).
Bridging these streams suggests a complex interplay between internal research, external
knowledge, and structure. Here it is useful to consider the insights from a third literature,
which has focused on the dynamics of resource recombination. Insofar as decentralization
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is associated with a modular organizational structure (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Karim,
2006), decentralized rms might nd it easier to deal with larger acquisitions. This is because
the target can be left to manage itself for the most part, much as other business units are
managed. Whether and when the acquired rm is integrated or recombined would depend on
the potential synergies with existing units (Karim and Mitchell, 2004), and will likely a¤ect the
future autonomy and performance of the target (Puranam, et al., 2006). By contrast, centralized
rms will likely have to rapidly integrate a target or allow it to function autonomously. In other
words, acquisitions of R&D-intensive targets can push the rm toward decentralization unless
the acquisition is rapidly integrated, which is costly.
For example, Microsoft has a centralized R&D structure and spent $9 billion on R&D in 2011.
Much of this has been in basic research, employing 850 PhDs and leading to key innovations
such as Xbox, tablet PC technology, font-resolution technology, and data-mining capabilities.
Microsoft has often acquired and built upon external technology, such as Spyglass (the basis
for Internet Explorer). Nonetheless, Microsoft has struggled with large acquisitions, such as
aQuantive, an online advertising technology rm bought in 2006. Press accounts suggest that
a key problem was the di¢ culty in integrating part of this acquisition into the Online Business
Service division. Other parts of aQuantive were ultimately spun o¤, but the overall deal failed
and was reported as a $6.2 billion write-o¤ in 2012. In contrast, the more recent acquisition of
Skype was handled di¤erently. Skype was left to operate as a standalone subsidiary, e¤ectively
moving Microsoft toward a more decentralized structure. This anecdote suggests that even
Microsofts vast technical absorptive capacity was not enough to overcome structural misalign-
ment, and it is the sort of puzzle that motivates us to take this rst step at disentangling the
role of structure from the role of internal research capabilities in relation to the acquisition of
external knowledge.
Clearly, many contingencies may inuence the direction in which a rms strategy and struc-
ture develop (Galbraith, 1977). However, a rm will perform well (and survive) if organizational
structure, internal research, and knowledge acquisition are aligned to support each other if they
are coherent (Siggelkow, 2011; Teece, et al., 1994; Nadler and Tushman, 1997). Indeed, as a
number of notable rm histories have shown, though structure and strategy are not permanent,
they seem to coevolve along complementary paths. For instance, DuPont, which relied upon ex-
ternal technologies such as cellophane and rayon before World War I, turned to internal research
in the 1930s to generate nylon and acrylics. Along with this shift, it also centralized its R&D
(Hounshell and Smith, 1988). But more recently, DuPont has adopted a more decentralized
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structure, with a number of research-intensive businesses operating as standalone subsidiaries.
Tellingly, most of these subsidiaries have come via large acquisitions, such as Pioneer Hi-Bred (a
$10 Billion seed and agro-chem rm) and Danisco (a $6Bn Danish food ingredients producer).
In e¤ect, the new strategy has reinforced the rms evolution toward decentralization, treating
acquisitions as new businesses which bring growth, rather than "key ingredients" to fuel growth
via internal recombination (Karim and Williams, 2012; Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998).
The evolution of Du Pont, from exploiting external innovations to relying upon internal
research to returning to acquisitions is instructive. The changes were sometimes driven by
changes in organizational structure, and in other cases, organizational structure adapted to the
change (Hounshell and Smith, 1988). What is important for our discussion is that, regardless
of the direction of causality, organizational structure and knowledge sourcing seemed to remain
coherent. We do not contend that one or the other innovation strategy is better. Rather, these
should depend upon the environment and the particularities of the rm itself. As Karim and
Mitchell (2004) put it: "The issue is not whether internal development or acquisitions are the
most appropriate means of obtaining resources, but how each of the two approaches provides
distinct contributions that [create value]." To this we would add that each approach likely
requires an organizational structure that is aligned with the approach, and thus increases the
likelihood of success.
3 Sample and Data
Our paper combines data from several sources: (i) patent-level information from the United
States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO), (ii) ownership structure data from Icarus by
Bureau van Djik (BvD), (iii) merger and acquisition data from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum
and Zephyr by BvD, (iv) scientic publications data from Thomsons ISI Web of Knowledge,
and (v) accounting information from Compustat. The Online Appendix details the procedures
used to construct our various datasets.
We identify the patents held by rms by selecting all patents granted by the USPTO between
1975 and 2007 and assigned to publicly traded US rms or their wholly owned subsidiaries (called
a¢ liates from now on). We match rms to patents by matching assignee names and addresses.
The matching is based on comparing the assignee name and address as it appears on the patent
document to the name and address of companies in BvDs Icarus database.
At the core of our measure is the fact that patents are often assigned to wholly owned a¢ liates
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of a parent rm. Because we can identify a¢ liate-parent relationships from the BvD database,
we can distinguish between "centralized" patents assigned to the parent and "decentralized"
patents assigned to a¢ liates. We match a total of 576,052 patents to 1,014 Compustat rms
(the "parent" or "headquarter" rms), which themselves own 2,768 a¢ liates. Of these, 100,951
(or 17.5%) of our sample patents are decentralized by our measure. To illustrate, Johnson and
Johnson (a highly decentralized rm) itself holds only a small fraction of its patents in its own
name. The rest are assigned to dozens of wholly owned a¢ liates.
Ownership data consists of two parts: cross-sectional ownership information from Icarus for
2008, and M&A data from SDC Platinum and Zephyr. The cross-sectional data shows active
a¢ liates as of 2008, while the M&A data helps us reconstruct ownership links to a¢ liates that
have dissolved. We exploit the substantial variation in post-merger structural integration (we
use the term "absorption" for brevity) to shed light on di¤erent acquisition strategies. This is
also the basis for a key variable in our analysis, namely the patents owned by a rm that come
through an acquisition.
To determine whether an acquired rm is absorbed or kept as an a¢ liate, we identify all
rms that have patents but are no longer active. We then match these rms to the SDC M&A
database to see whether any of these rms have been directly acquired by a sample rm or by
one of the a¢ liates of a sample rm. For example, we identify 121 patents assigned to WebTV
Networks, a rm that did not exist as a separate company in 2008. By matching to SDC, we
can see that WebTV was purchased in 1997 by Microsoft, then dissolved and absorbed into
Microsofts MSN Networks. This measurement approach works because the original assignee is
recorded at the time of the patent grant, allowing us to identify patents by rms (like WebTV)
even when the original assignee is dissolved.
3.1 Patent Assignment as a Proxy for Decentralization
A major empirical contribution of our paper is the development of a new patent-based measure
of decentralization. A virtue of our measure is that it relies on published data and is readily
replicable and scalable. Whereas a rms research focus and external knowledge-sourcing activi-
ties can be tracked using patents, R&D spending or alliances (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella,
2001; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996), the internal orga-
nization of R&D is extremely di¢ cult to observe. This fundamentally "within the black box"
rm characteristic is by far the most understudied of the three dimensions we discuss here.
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Notable studies in this domain have utilized small samples (Lerner and Wulf, 2007) often ac-
knowledging this limitation and the need for "future empirical research [to] examine the key
relationships in larger samples and across longer time periods" (Argyres and Silverman, 2004).
As our new measure does precisely this, it promises to open a new window into the internal
organization of rmsR&D function.
We classify individual patents as centralized or decentralized based on whether they are
assigned to the parent rm or to the a¢ liate. Aggregating up to the parent rm level provides
share patents assigned, our measure of how centralized or decentralized a rms patent portfolio
is. We also use a discrete version of this measure which classies a rm as decentralized, hybrid,
or decentralized based on the tertile of share patents assigned to which it belongs. For ease of
exposition we use "centralized rms" rather than "rms with centralized R&D organizational
structure," since focus is on how research is organized, although we suspect our ndings extend
to rm structure more broadly. Patent assignment as a measure of decentralization has three
important advantages: it is based on observed behavior, it is useful for large samples, and it is
replicable.
Patent assignments here have no ownership implications because our American headquarters
fully own their a¢ liates and thus maintain ultimate rights, regardless of who manages the
patents. However, we interpret patent assignment as a proxy for the delegation of authority or
autonomy over R&D management. Assignment may reinforce the identication and long-term
ties between a manager and the intellectual property under her charge, so that opportunistic
behavior becomes costly in terms of reputation (Baker, et al., 2002), or it may increase division
workers intrinsic sense of autonomy (Puranam et al., 2006). Similarly, assignment of patent
rights may be associated with a credible delegation of informal authority, since assignment allows
the a¢ liate to directly contract with outside licensees, without formally requiring headquarters
to "sign o¤" on deals. More simply, assignment may reect a broader "hands o¤" orientation.
We are agnostic as to which mechanism might be at play, since all evidence points to assignment
as associated with increase autonomy. Conversely, it is di¢ cult to argue that such assignments
would in any way reduce a divisions autonomy. Nonetheless, assignment of patents to a¢ liates
may be su¢ cient - but not necessary for decentralization, because a business or division inside
a rm may have de facto authority over its R&D and innovation, but still not have any patents
assigned to it. As with any proxy measure that lends itself to large-scale empirical analysis, our
measure is practical but imperfect, and we admit that there are trade-o¤s to consider. In our
case, there may be sources of unobserved heterogeneity that are not mitigated by our battery of
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controls. Future work should continue to explore both the potential and limits of this empirical
approach.
To better understand the implications of our measure, we conducted several interviews
with IP managers, attorneys, and high-level executive at rms in a range of industries. Our
discussions reinforced the interpretation that assignment is strongly associated with e¤ective
delegation of authority in the R&D process. In fact, not one person interviewed found this
association surprising. For example, a Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel for a global
medical devices rm opined that patent assignment to a¢ liates "reects the underlying structure
of the rm," and that it indicates with high certainty that "a¢ liates enjoy autonomy regarding
IP, choice of R&D projects, and perhaps also in the overall R&D investment by the division,
(condentiality prevents us from disclosing the managers and companies we interviewed).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We also examined the patterns of assignment for prominent rms whose R&D structure is
well known. For example, Figure 1 compares the pattern of patent assignment for two promi-
nent, diversied pharmaceutical and health care companies. For each rm we show the share
of patents assigned to their top 30 a¢ liates (we aggregates as "other" all small a¢ liates be-
yond 30), inclusive of the headquarter. We can see that these patterns are markedly di¤erent.
Johnson and Johnson only has 9.4% of its patents assigned to headquarters (highly decentral-
ized in our measure), which maps well to its reputation of being "the reference company for
being decentralized," as characterized by its own CEO, William Weldon.1 By contrast, Abbott
Laboratories assigned 59% of its patents to headquarters. Despite shifting to a more decentral-
ized (and more acquisitive) strategy in the past few years, Abbott has traditionally relied on
centralized R&D (Mayer, 2003). Though there is no systematic way to perform this detailed
analysis for our large sample, these and other manual checks were extremely encouraging.
More systematically, we validated our measure by comparing how closely it replicated the
categorization by Argyres and Silvermans 2004 study ("AS"), which classied 71 rms as cen-
tralized, decentralized, or hybrid based on self-reported organizational structure. Considering
that 12 years separate the data in our respective studies, and that AS included some rms that
are not listed on American stock exchanges, we were fortunate to have 56 of their 71 rms in our
sample. We nd that our patent-based measure perfectly matches 38 out of 56 (68%) rms as
1http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2003
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centralized, decentralized, or hybrid. Importantly, 15 out of the 18 mismatches involved hybrids,
rather than diametrically opposite classications. This is signicant because it suggests that
our misalignment with AS could be due to a sensitivity to thresholds of classication, rather
than to our measure pointing in the wrong direction. Impressively, there were only three rms
where our respective classications were diametrically opposed (that is, where our centralized
rms were decentralized in AS, or vice-versa). Thus we are condent that our measure is a
reasonable empirical proxy for the decentralization of R&D.
3.2 Other variable denitions and measures
Internal Research focus. Our main measure of internal research is based on scientic publica-
tions. We use publication intensity, dened as the number of publications in scientic journal
divided by sales, to measure how much the rm invests in internal research. Scientic publica-
tions are a commonly accepted measure of a rms basic science orientation (Gambardella, 1995;
Stern, 2004), and rms such as DuPont, IBM, Merck, and Microsoft, which have traditionally
relied upon internally generated innovations, have also tended to produce a great number of
scientic publications.
We use three supplemental measures to probe the robustness of our results to alternate
measures, since the literature suggests a variety of empirical proxies. R&D intensity is measured
as discounted stock of R&D, divided by lagged sales. R&D stock is calculated using a perpetual
inventory method with a 15% depreciation rate (Hall, Ja¤e, and Trajtenberg, 2005). So the
R&D stock, GRD, in year t is GRDt = Rt+(1 )GRDt 1 where Rt is the R&D expenditure in
year t and  = 0:15. Typically, rms that rely upon internal research to fuel growth have higher
levels of R&D intensity. Similarly, we also expect rms with a higher share of breakthrough
product innovations to le for more patents from a given R&D investment, when compared to
rms doing relatively more incremental and short-term research. Note that this measure may
also reect a rms strategy for appropriating rents from R&D (Cohen et al., 2000), as well as
the incentives for patenting it provides its internal researchers. As a result, we also use patent
propensity, dened as the number of citation weighted patents divided by R&D stock. For each
patent we compute the number of citations it receives in a period of 15 years since its grant
year, and normalize this count by the average number of citations received by all patents that
were granted in the same year as the focal patent.
External orientation. We use multiple measures to capture external orientation. Our primary
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measure is share patents acquired, dened as the share of patents within the total stock of the
rms patents that came to the rm via an acquisition, as opposed to having been generated
by the rm (including its rms a¢ liates). This captures the degree to which a rm relies on
externally acquired technology (Capron et al., 1998; Karim, 2006). An ancillary measure is
acquirer, a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every year when the rm makes an
acquisition (the unit of observation here is rm-year). Our last two measures provide insight
into the type of targets that the rm acquires and happens to them post-acquisition. We
classify a target as "large" if it had at least 32 (this is the top tertile in terms of patents
acquired per transaction) or we classify it as "small" if it had fewer than 5 patents (lowest
quartile). Dividing the number of small acquisitions by a rms total acquisitions gives us our
share small. To explore post-merger integration, we divide a rms count of patent-weighted
absorbed acquisitions by the total number of targets, to obtain share absorbed.
Organizational structure. As described earlier, we use share patents assigned, a continuous
measure of decentralization, and a discrete classication of rms based on the measure. We
classify rms according to tertiles of share of patents assigned, and operationalize using cate-
gorical variables. These categories are: centralized (lowest tertile), hybrid (second tertile), and
decentralized (third tertile). We use the centralized category as our baseline in all regressions.
Market value. Consistent with a long tradition in the economics of innovation literature
(Griliches, 1982), market value is dened as the sum of the values of common stock, preferred
stock, and total debt net of current assets. The book value of capital includes net plant,
property and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles
other than R&D. Patents Stock is calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15%
depreciation rate. Patents stock in year t is calculated as Patents stockt = Pt+(1  )Patents
stockt 1 where Pt is the citations-weights ow of patents in year t. In an important advance to
this methodology, we can account separately for internal and external patents stock, and are
thus able to disaggregate how these di¤erently contribute to rm value.
3.3 Descriptive statistics and evidence of persistence
Average value of sales in our sample is $3.4 billion, and market value is $5.9 billion (of which $3
billion are in physical assets). As for innovation, average R&D spending is $129 million, patent
stock is 174, and scientic publications is 58. At the rm level, 33% of the stock of patents are
assigned to a¢ liates, and 27% of patents are acquired.
11
Our observed measures of strategy are highly persistent over time at the rm level. An
analysis of variance (not presented in a table) indicates that between-rm variation accounts
for 87%, 81%, and 88% of the total variance for share patents acquired, share patents assigned,
and publication intensity, respectively. In other words, the bulk of the variation in our measures
is between rms rather than variation over time within a rm. This strongly supports the view
that there are reinforcing interactions among the various choices, which may make it di¢ cult
or undesirable for rms to abruptly change any of their core strategies. We do not suggest
that rms are static. It may be that as rms mature, some may become more exploitative
rather than explorativeas they focus on commercialization. Alternatively, more mature rms
may be the only ones that can support large internal research, which would imply the opposite.
However, as discussed earlier, it took nearly a century for DuPont to go from decentralized to
centralized and back. Thus, it may be that this sort of evolution occurs at a pace that is too
gradual for our data to capture.
We perform an additional test to measure the stability of our focal strategies over time by
comparing a rms ordinal ranking for each measure at the end of the sample to the ranking
on the rst year it appears in the sample. Thus, we see whether a rm assigned to a particular
quartile in its rst year is assigned to a di¤erent quartile in the last year. This way of assessing
persistence obviates the need to control for changes in the environment or changes in rm size
or other such variables.
We observe very little variation in publication intensity within rms over time. Over 91
percent of rms are in the same quartile of publication intensity at the end of the period as they
were at the start of the period. Only about 6 percent of rms move up in the distribution at
all, and less than 3 percent move up by at two quartiles or more. About 4 percent of all rms
move down the distribution, but none drops by more than a single quartile.
We observe slightly more time variation in share patents acquired, with 82 percent of rms not
changing their acquisition category, 12 percent of the rms becoming relatively more acquisition-
intensive over time, and 6 percent of all rms dropping down at least one quartile. Finally, there
is more time variation in share patents assigned, where 59 percent of the rms in our sample do
not change their assignment category throughout the sample period. Here, 25 percent of rms
move up in decentralization distribution, and the remaining 16 percent of rms move down (i.e.,
become more centralized relative to the population). Of all the rms that change quartile (up
or down), nearly three quarters move by only one quartile in rank over the entire sample period.
In sum, we nd that the bulk of the variation is across rms, despite the fact that our sample
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period (19752007) witnessed many changes in the environment, including the energy crises of
the 1970s, the merger waves of the 1980s, the rise of the high-tech sector, and globalization.
This persistence makes it meaningful to speak of coherence across choices that rms make along
the focal dimensions of innovation strategy namely internal research, external knowledge, and
organizational structure.
[Insert Table 1 here]
3.4 Relationships among structure, external orientation, and inter-
nal research
3.4.1 Non-parametric analysis
We begin by exploring the relationships between organization, acquisitions, and internal re-
search in Table 2. Specically, we look at how both share patents acquired and publication
intensity vary across rms with varying levels of decentralization. Consistent with our coher-
ence arguments, we nd discrete patterns of heterogeneity among rms, where centralization is
associated both with lower reliance on acquired patents and with greater publication intensity.
Table 2 shows three important relationships. First, there is signicant variation in size across
decentralization categories (columns 1 and 2). Decentralized rms have the lowest patent stock.
Hybrid rms are the largest both in terms of sales and number of patents. Centralized rms
are smaller than decentralized rms in terms of sales, but they have close to double the number
of patents. This variation in size and patenting highlights the importance of controlling for
rm size in our parametric explorations. As well, it suggests that even though hybrids are
classied based on our decentralization measure, they need not be similarly positioned in other
dimensions. In fact, as we shall show, hybrids are not always along the continuum between
centralized and decentralized. Future work should further explore the unique attributes of this
group.
Second, in column 3 we see that average share of acquired patents increases steeply as we
move from centralized rms (11% of patents acquired) to decentralized rms (87% of patents
acquired). In unreported analyses, we nd that the same pattern of results holds when we
examine the percentage of rms that are classied in the top tertile of share patents acquired:
only 11% of centralized rms are in the top tertile of share patents acquired, compared to 57%
of decentralized rms.
An important goal for this study is to better understand the relationship between structure
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and external orientation. We further explore this in Columns 4-8, which show a strong positive
relationship between the two. We distinguish between two types of acquired units. Dissolved
units are those that cease to operate independently and consequently transfer their patents to the
parent. Conversely, kept units not only retain the patents that they had prior to acquisition but
also continue to be assigned new patents generated post-acquisition. As shown in Columns 4 and
5, a rms acquisition volume is highly correlated with the relationship between decentralization
and external orientation. However, it is important to note that this relationship is also driven by
how the rm deals with acquisitions, not simply by how acquisitive the rm is. This is because
rms vary in the degree to which they let acquisitions remain independent (which is the channel
through which acquisitions lead to decentralization), as well as in the size of the target rms
that they acquire. Column 4 shows that centralized rms make substantially fewer acquisitions
than hybrid or decentralized rms (3.5 versus 10.8 and 12.6 total acquisitions over the study
period, respectively). Normalizing number of acquisitions by sales (column 5), suggests that the
negative association between centralization and acquisitions is nearly linear. While centralized
rms make 1.9 acquisitions per billion of dollar in sales, hybrids make 3, and decentralized
rms make 5.3 acquisitions. More importantly, there is a clear distinction in post-acquisition
absorption strategy (column 6). Centralized rms absorb 64% of their targets, compared to
42% for hybrids and only 21% for decentralized rms.
Columns 7 and 8 present evidence on average size of the acquired pool of patents. Centralized
rms acquired substantially smaller portfolios, averaging 26 patents per deal, while there is little
di¤erence between hybrid and decentralized rms, which both average 50 patents per acquisition.
As shown in column 8, there appears to be systematic variation in acquisition size. We classify
acquired a¢ liates as small if the number of patents they hold at the year of acquisition is in the
lowest 25 percent of the distribution of number of patents by acquired rms. 61 percent of the
targets by centralized rms are classied a small, as compared to 43 percent by hybrid, and 37
percent by decentralized rms. This nding is signicant because it points to one reason for the
di¤erences in absorption rates. Smaller acquisitions, possibly representing young technology-
based rms, should be easier to absorb into an existing division, whereas large acquisitions are
both harder to integrate and also more capable of operating as a standalone subsidiary. Later in
the analysis, we show that even after controlling for characteristics of the acquiring rm, small
acquisitions are more likely to be absorbed (Column 5 in Table 3). In sum, we nd that the
relationship between acquisition and decentralization is driven not only by how acquisitive the
rm is, but also by the relative size of the acquisition (in terms of patents) and the extent to
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which acquired targets are kept independent or integrated into the parent.
These ndings are important because structural integration is one of the levers that managers
use to shape both the nature of research and the structure of the rm (Haspeslagh and Jemison,
1991; Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006). Thus, regardless of a rms rate of acquisition, the
decision to absorb or not absorb may ultimately have the bigger e¤ect on how decentralized
it is (for example Microsoft acquires a lot, yet remains centralized). However, the decision
to absorb may be related to the nature of research that a rm performs, if basic research
involves resource recombination, which in turn may require the absorption of the acquired
entity (Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998). Alternatively, the decision to absorb may reect
a mix of coherence and inertia (i.e. centralized rms have so many complementary systems and
structures that integration is less costly, while it may also have a managerial philosophy which
favors absorption).
Third, we nd a striking negative relationship between structure and internal research.
Centralized rms publish much more per dollar of sales revenue than decentralized rms, and
they have substantially higher R&D intensity. As shown in column 10, centralized rms have
the highest ratio of publications to sales (21.4), decentralized have the lowest ratio (6.6), and
hybrid rms lie in the middle (10.5). A similar picture emerges if we use R&D intensity instead
of publication intensity. Column 12 shows that centralized rms have an R&D to sales ratio of
0.43, as compared to a ratio of 0.29 for hybrid rms, and 0.21 for decentralized rms.
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here]
The patterns of results reported in table 2 capture the coherence logic. We show this more
starkly in gure 2, which plots how the values for external orientation (Column 3, Table 2)
and research orientation (Column 10, Table 2) move in opposite directions. External orienta-
tion increases with the degree of decentralization whereas research orientation decreases with
decentralization.
Because the simple relationships in Tables 2 and 3 may reect industry e¤ects, as well as
di¤erences in rm characteristics, we next perform a parametric analysis that controls for these
factors.
3.4.2 Parametric analysis
Our ndings thus far serve as large-scale validation and extension of earlier studies. However
they are not conditioned on important variables that may drive the observed relationships
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between our focal variables. To mitigate such concerns, we move to parametric analysis. We
emphasize that the patterns of association we report should not be interpreted in a causal
sensewe do not argue that a choice made in one dimension should determine a choice in
another dimension. Instead, we show the conditional correlations between our measures, while
gradually removing sources of co-variation such as rm size and industry e¤ects.
Table 3 presents the conditional relationship between the acquisition of external knowledge,
internal research, and decentralization. We cluster standard errors by rm, and include 248 four-
digit SIC dummies as industry xed e¤ects. Columns 1-7 present the conditional correlation of
decentralization with external orientation, and Columns 8-13 present the conditional correlation
of decentralization with internal research.
Column 1 shows a very large coe¢ cient estimate on the dummy for decentralization (0.75),
and a much lower estimate on the coe¢ cient on the dummy for hybrid (0.17). In column 2 we
also control for publications intensity (the lagged ratio between publications stock and sales) as
a measure of internal research. The coe¢ cient estimates on structure are not a¤ected by control-
ling for publications intensity. The coe¢ cient estimate on publications intensity is negative and
signicant, indicating that, conditional on structure, higher internal research is associated with
less acquisition activity. In unreported specications we explore the extent to which structure
conditions the publications-acquisitions relationship. Estimating the specication from Column
2 without the structure dummies yields a large and statistically signicant coe¢ cient for publi-
cation intensity of -0.1, whereas controlling for structure causes the coe¢ cient to drop in half.
In other words, structure strongly conditions the negative relationship between publication ac-
tivity and rmsacquisition of external knowledge. We nd similar patterns with alternative
measures of research orientation, such as the lagged log of the ratio of R&D stock to sales. Not
controlling for structure, there is a strong negative relationship between R&D intensity and
external orientation: the coe¢ cient estimate on R&D intensity is -0.12 and is highly signicant
(a standard error of 0.04). Controlling for structure, however, this estimate drops to -0.03 and
is no longer signicant.
In additional unreported specications, the results remain unchanged when we restrict the
sample to rms that make at least one acquisition, indicating that our estimates are not likely
to stem from comparing acquiring to non-acquiring rms.
These results suggest that rms with high internal research investments acquire less external
knowledge, not just because of their internal R&D focus, but also because such rms also have a
more centralized structure, which itself is also correlated with fewer acquisitions. In other words,
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this nding suggests that analyzing the relationship between internal and external knowledge,
without accounting for the organizational structure of the rm, may be misleading.
Columns 3 to 5 show that both centralized rms and research-intensive rms, as well as
rms that tend to make smaller acquisitions, are more likely to absorb their acquisitions. In
unreported specications we nd that the estimated coe¢ cients of publication intensity and
share patents assigned are largely independent of whether the other measure is included or not.
This suggests that both centralization and a focus on internal research are associated with a
greater likelihood that the target is absorbed. This supports the notion that centralized rms
would acquire more nascent external technology to integrate into their existing research (Capron
et al., 1998; Karim, 2006), whereas decentralized rms may acquire more developed technology
that is closer to being commercialized (e.g., Ciscos "acquire and develop" model).
We next examine the relationship between the share of small acquisitions and structure
(columns 6 and 7). We nd that centralized rms are more likely to engage in smaller acquisi-
tions. Surprisingly, we nd no systematic relationship between internal research and the share
of small acquisitions (column 7). In unreported results where we do not control for structure,
the coe¢ cient estimate on publications intensity is once again small and insignicant. In other
words, whether conditional on structure or by itself, publications intensity is not correlated
with the share of small acquisitions. This is a surprising result, particularly since smaller ac-
quisitions are more likely to be absorbed (Column 5), and internal research is associated with
greater likelihood of absorption of targets (Column 4). We nd the same pattern when we
measure internal research using R&D intensity instead of publications intensity. Whether this
reects a limitation of our measures or a deeper puzzle is a topic for future research.
In sum, Columns 1 to 7 support our conjecture that, at least in part, internal research is
related to external knowledge acquisition because internal research is also related to organiza-
tional structure, which in turn is related to external knowledge. Columns 8 to 13 investigate
the same issue but shifts the analysis to concentrate on the nature of internal research and
its relationship to both structure and external acquisitions. We supplement our main measure
of internal research investment with R&D stock and patent propensity. We use logs of both
publication and R&D stock. By using log of sales as a control, we allow for a more exible rela-
tionship than if we simply used the ratio of publication to sales or R&D to sales as a dependent
variable.
In columns 8 and 9 we regress publications stock as the dependent variable. We nd a strong
negative relationship between decentralization and scientic publications: decentralized rms
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publish 48 percent less than centralized rms. There is no di¤erence, however, between hybrid
rms and centralized rms (Column 8). We also nd a negative relation between publications
and share patents acquired (column 9), however, it is not statistically signicant when controlling
for structure. When not controlling for structure (not reported), the coe¢ cient estimate on share
patents acquired is very large in absolute value and is highly signicant (-0.31 with a standard
error of 0.12). Organization structure thus is signicantly associated with investment in internal
research, even after conditioning on external knowledge sourcing. This nding, that the relation
between internal research and external orientation is strongly mediated by structure, warrants
further study.
Columns 10 to 13 show that similar patterns obtain when we repeat these tests using our
alternative measures of internal research focus. The pattern of our ndings is strongly con-
sistent across all specications. One notable exception is Column 13, where we nd a strong
negative relationship between external orientation and patent propensity, even when controlling
for structure. In unreported specications, we nd weaker results for citations per patent, where
hybrid rms show the highest citations per patent.
Overall, Table 3 shows that the simple patterns reported in Tables 2 are not just due to
di¤erences in industry, rm size, or time. As we expected, the choices of rms along the
three focal elements of innovation strategy are not randomly distributed, so the choice along
one dimension is systematically predictive of choices in the other two dimensions. Moreover,
our results also point to the intriguing (and understudied) role that organizational structure
may play in the overall innovation strategy. Whereas innovation scholars have focused on the
relationship between internal research and external knowledge, Table 3 suggests that internal
structure signicantly conditions the relationship between internal research and acquisition of
external knowledge.
One must be cautious in interpreting these patterns because they may reect di¤erences in
the precision with which we measure various concepts. Yet, this calls for further research, both
theoretical and empirical, into the ways in which the internal organization of the rm interacts
with investments in internal and external knowledge. We still know very little about the origins
of structure whether it arises alongside strategy, for example, or is driven by strategy and
this focuses attention on why this neglected pillar of organizational research (Gavetti, Levinthal,
and Ocasio, 2007) needs more attention.
[Insert Table 3]
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3.5 Firm Market Value
We have shown that centralization is associated with investment in basic research while decen-
tralization is associated with a strong emphasis on accessing external innovations. We have also
argued that these patterns may reect the underlying innovation strategy of the rm. If this
so, the innovation strategy of a rm should have direct implications for how the rm creates
value: Centralized rmsinternally generated knowledge should be a key source of value cre-
ation, whereas external knowledge should drive market value for decentralized rms. In other
words, we would expect that unmeasured intangible assetsshould account for a greater share
of value for centralized rms relative to decentralized rms, since internal investments in re-
search are more di¢ cult to measure than acquisitions of external knowledge. Indeed, we nd
that the average market to bookratio (commonly known as Tobins Q) is 1.5 for centralized
rms, but only 1.3 for decentralized rms.
A more consequential implication of this is that not only should centralized rms have more
intangible assets, the intangible portion of their assets should also be more heavily related to
internal knowledge. Conversely, the intangible assets of decentralized rms should be related
more closely to acquisitions of external knowledge. We are able to empirically examine this by
estimating a version of the value function approach proposed by Griliches (1981). We stress
variation across rms rather than within-rm variation, because as we have already shown, the
vast bulk of the variation in internal structure is across rms, rather than within rms.
Table 4 presents the estimation results. We begin by estimating a standard value function,
using two measures of knowledge stock R&D stock and patent stock. To control for patent
quality we weight each patent by the ratio between the number of citations it receives and
one plus the average number of citations received by all patents that were granted in the same
year (one is added to both numerator and denominator to avoid zero weights). In the baseline
specications we control for the log of lagged assets, industry xed e¤ects (using 197 four-digit
SIC dummies), and year e¤ects. Later in the analysis we also control for sales and sales growth,
as well as split the sample by technical diversication and size.
Columns 1 and 2 show that R&D stock and patent stock are both positively associated
with value. We also see that their e¤ects are largely independent, as the coe¢ cient of R&D
stock falls only slightly when patent stock is added. Column 3 distinguishes between patents
that are generated internally and "external" patents that are acquired via M&A transactions.
Both internal and external patents seem positively associated with market value, and have very
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similar coe¢ cients. However, as we shall show, these average results mask stark di¤erences
across rms with di¤erent organizational structures.
Columns 4 to 6 split the sample into tertiles of decentralization using the same classication
from Tables 2 and 3. The rst striking nding in column 4 is that for centralized rms R&D
stock has a very large and highly signicant positive correlation with market value (a coe¢ cient
estimate of 0.16), but whereas internal patents continue to be associated with value, external
patents cease to matter. On the other hand, we see the opposite pattern for decentralized rms
(column 6). Here we nd a large positive correlation between external patents and value for
decentralized rms (coe¢ cient estimate of 0.08), and an R&D coe¢ cient estimate which is less
than half of what we observe for centralized rms. This pattern is consistent with the idea that
there are di¤erent routes to value creation, which require di¤erent supporting organizational
structures. Firms relying on internal research to create value should nd centralization more
compatible with their objective. Conversely, a decentralized rm should be more likely to derive
value from acquired patents.
Columns 7 to 9 add sales and sales growth as controls. The patterns regarding R&D stock
remains robust. But there is an interesting change in the estimate on external patents for
decentralized rms. Controlling for sales and sales growth, this coe¢ cient drops to 0.05 (not
statistically signicant) from an estimate of 0.08 without these controls. In fact, this drop
is mostly attributed to controlling for sales growth: when excluding sales growth but still
controlling for sales, the coe¢ cient estimate on external patents stock is 0.07 and is statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level. This intriguing result points to a fruitful avenue for future
research to investigate whether decentralized rms are more reliant upon growth to create value,
and do so by commercializing and scaling up external innovations, whereas centralized rms use
internally generated innovations.
If what we are capturing is related to the importance of alignment between organizational
structure and the knowledge-sourcing strategy, we should expect our results to be stronger for
larger rms and for rms that operate in a diverse range of businesses and technologies, relative
to smaller rms and rms that are narrowly focused. This is because for small and undiversied
rms, the formal organizational structure will be more malleable (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).
To probe this conjecture we divide rms by their degree of technical diversity. We measure
technical diversity by the number of technology areas in which the rm patents. We classify
rms as having low or high technological diversity according to the sample median value of the
number of three-digit technology classes the rm patents in.
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Finally, we note that for centralized rms, the amount of assets held account for a much
smaller share of the value than in decentralized rms, consistent with the simple di¤erences in
Tobins Q discussed earlier. Even more intriguingly, sales growth is considerably more strongly
associated with market value in decentralized rms than in centralized rms. However, inter-
preting market-value regression coe¢ cients is not straightforward (see for instance, Czarnitzki
et al., 2006), and we must leave it to more future research with more ne-grained measures to
pursue these tantalizing lines of inquiry.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Despite the coarseness of the measurement, Table 5 shows that the contrast between R&D
stock and external patents appears to be substantially driven by diversied rms and by large
rms. We acknowledge that this measure is imperfect, because it measures technical diversity
rather than product market diversity, and because it is likely highly correlated with the scale
of the rms patenting activities. Future work should explore how these results hold up with
more granular business-level data.
Columns 16 show the results for diversied and specialized rms. Among the set of techni-
cally diversied rms, centralized rms derive considerable value from internal R&D, whereas
decentralized rms derive little value from internal R&D (coe¢ cient estimates of 0.16 versus
-0.01). Centralized rms derive less value from external patents than do decentralized rms,
although the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients is not statistically signicant (0.03 compared to 0.05).
By contrast, the t between internal structure and knowledge sourcing in creating value seems
to matter less for specialized rms. All rms derive value from internal R&D, although the re-
liance is more marked among centralized rather than decentralized rms, and external patents
appear to be uncorrelated with value.
Diversied rms tend to be large as well. To explore this aspect, we divided rms by size,
classifying rms as large if their sales were above the median level of sales. Columns 7 to 12
show that patterns observed in Table 4 are also more marked for large rms, implying that we
cannot condently distinguish whether the greater salience of structure in such rms reects
the e¤ects of diversity or size. In large rms, R&D stock is associated with value for centralized
rms but not decentralized rms (coe¢ cient estimate of 0.09 compared to 0.01). Conversely,
external patents are associated with value in decentralized rms but not in centralized rms
(coe¢ cient estimate of 0.10 compared to 0.03).
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Overall, our ndings support the interpretation that rms that rely upon internal research
to create value are best served by a centralized organization, in contrast to rms that rely
upon external knowledge, especially in large or technically diversied rms. More importantly,
rms seem to be able to derive proportionally more or less value from internal or external
knowledge depending on their overall set of characteristics, even when they utilize both internal
and external as inputs.
[Insert Table 5 here]
3.6 Robustness
In a number of unreported tests, we probed the robustness of the relationships documented in
Table 3. We summarize these tests briey.
Size: We checked the sensitivity of our results to rm size by excluding very small and very
large rms from the sample (lowest and highest sales deciles). This ensures that the conditional
correlations presented above are not driven by comparing very small to very large rms. We
nd similar results to those reported here, reassuring us that cross-rm size variation does not
drive the main relationships in our data.
Geography: Though there is a growing literature on the geographical location and manage-
ment of R&D activities (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011; Singh, 2008), the question of geography is
logically distinct from the question of internal organization. For example, as Singh (2008) puts
it, a rm could have a decentralized formal organization even with relatively small number of
R&D locations, while another rm might have a much more centralized organization despite
having a much greater number of R&D locations. Though the location of activities obviously has
implications for how they should be managed, other considerations such as access to users, tal-
ented researchers, or knowledge spillovers are also important geography considerations (Kogut,
1991; Ja¤e, 1986). Nonetheless, in order to mitigate against contamination from impacts of
geography on our sample we add a vector of 197 location dummies which control for the share
of patents that each rm generates within a given Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA). The
results in Tables 4 and 5 are largely unchanged.
A¢ liates: We also conrm that our results continue to hold when we exclude from our
sample 212 rms with no a¢ liates. By construction, their share of assigned patents is zero
(thus these rms are classied as centralized). To test whether our set of relationships is driven
by the distinction between rms with and without a¢ liates, we estimate the main specications
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for a sample that includes only rms with at least one a¢ liate, regardless of whether the a¢ liate
patents or not. Demonstrating that our results continue to hold also within a sample of rms
that have at least one a¢ liate eliminates the concern that the results are driven by comparing
rms with and without a¢ liates.
Patenting scale: Another potential concern relates to rms that have relatively few patents.
Our measure of decentralization is based on the ratio between assigned patents and total patents
held by the rm. This ratio is likely to be less informative for rms with a small number of
patents. We estimate the main specications for a sample that excludes rms with fewer than
15 patents in total, and nd results similar to those reported here.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we exploit rich new data on over a thousand American rms to explore the inter-
play among three important dimensions of innovation strategy: R&D organizational structure,
external knowledge sourcing, and internal research focus. A new measure of decentralization
allows us to perform the rst such large-scale study, documenting patterns supporting the view
that rms make consistent and coherent choices along these three dimensions. This yields some
important contributions. First, we validate prior ndings in the literature that have shown a
link between structure and the nature of innovation (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Lerner and
Wulf, 2007), with an empirical approach that mitigates small sample problems and improves
replicability. Second, we document a pattern that strongly suggests a positive link between
decentralization and external orientation. To our knowledge, this relationship has not received
any attention in the literature. These are valuable contributions, especially given the growing
awareness within the strategy eld of the need for more studies that document "just the facts"
(Oxley et al., 2010; Hambrick, 2007; Bettis, 2012).
Third, we go beyond mere descriptions, as our analysis claries and extends prior results
that relied on simpler one-to-one relationships. We nd that structure strongly conditions
the negative relationship that has been shown between internal research and the acquisition
of external knowledge. Documenting this contingency is interesting and important beyond
our setting. Though recent work has highlighted the importance of structure as a "forgotten
pillar" of organizational theory (Gavetti, et al., 2007; Joseph and Ocasio, 2012), organizational
structure remains stubbornly di¢ cult to observe, and its role in shaping information processing
and incentives continues to puzzle managers and researchers (Wulf, 2012). Consistent with the
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implications of Karim and Mitchells (2004) ndings, we also nd that internal and external
outputs provide di¤erent contributions to di¤erent rms. Whereas centralized rms derive more
value from internal R&D, decentralized rms do so from externally acquired patents.
It is likely that rms that innovate primarily by developing knowledge internally favor in-
vestments in more basic, long-term research and do not rely much on incremental research that
merely improves existing goods and services. Typically, such basic research is best centralized
because individual business units are unlikely to support it adequately. Our ndings suggest
that these rms rely less on external knowledge, and may use it principally to complement their
internal knowledge. By contrast, other rms may be unwilling or unable to make the same
large investments in internal research to fuel innovation and growth. Their internal R&D is
likely to be focused on improving existing products and processes, which is best managed by
the business units that produce those products and services. Our ndings suggest that such
rms are more likely to look outside for new technologies. Given limited internal capability
for evaluating and assimilating nascent technologies, they may favor the acquisition of proven
technologies, embodied within target rms that can operate independently and contribute to
the commercialization e¤orts.
Neither strategy is intrinsically better, and in fact most rms do a mix of both. Firms
choose more of one or the other based on their particular context, which may be shaped by their
initial founding conditions and capabilities, their environment, and how their capabilities and
environments evolve (Nadler and Tushman, 1997). What may matter more is how a particular
combination of strategies maps to the rms capabilities. The upshot is that di¤erent types
of knowledge strategies can create value, if matched to the right context and aligned with the
appropriate organizational structure.
Though our empirical strategy generates new insights from the concurrent examination of
these various strategic choices and outcomes, it is not meant to establish the direction of causal-
ity. Future work should further exploit our novel measure of decentralization, as well as time
and exogenous variation in order to better explain the systematic patterns we have described.
But just as importantly, our empirical ndings should inform future theory development, in
the quest to understand the link between innovation strategy and structure. In particular, we
highlight the importance of organizational structure as an integral part of corporate strategy.
From a normative perspective, our paper should alert managers to the perils of prescriptions
which do not account for the three main facets of R&D strategy. For example, given the role of
structure in conditioning the relationship between internal development and external knowledge
24
integration, it is unlikely that innovation strategy can be charted using a simple "make vs. buy"
logic, if this does not take into account the complex role played by organizational structure.
Conversely, knowledge-intensive rms contemplating radical change in terms of increasing or
decreasing their centralization should take into account the way in which structure will shape
other dimensions of innovation strategy.
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Figure 1a: An example of a decentralized pattern of patent assignment. Top 30 affiliates shown  
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Figure 1b: An example of a centralized pattern of patent assignment. Top 30 affiliates shown  
Variable # Obs. # Firms Mean Std. Dev. 10th 50th 90th
Share patents assigned 11,304 1,014 0.33 0.42 0 0.03 1
Share patents acquired 11,304 1,014 0.27 0.41 0 0 1
Publications flow 11,304 1,014 10 58 0 0 8
Publications stock 11,304 1,014 58 389 0 0 20
R&D expenditures ($mm) 11,304 1,014 129 498 0 10 237
R&D stock  ($mm) 11,304 1,014 489 1,820 0 34 945
R&D stock / Sales ($mm) 11,304 1,014 0.30 0.71 0 0.10 0.64
Patents flow 11,304 1,014 26 101 0 2 46
Patents stock 11,304 1,014 174 664 2 19 314
Market value ($mm) 11,304 1,014 5,920 20,278 33 677 12,208
Sales t-1  ($mm) 11,304 1,014 3,410 9,805 35 600 8,205
Assets t-1  ($mm) 11,304 1,014 3,017 9,681 24 397 7,328
Number of employees 11,304 1,014 17,290 40,528 307 4,000 44,500
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables in our final estimation sample. The unit of observation is firm-year. Share patents 
assigned  divides the stock of patents that are assigned to affiliates by total patents stock. Share patents acquired  divides the stock of acquired patents by 
total patents stock.
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Average 
sales
Average 
patents 
Stock
Share of 
patents 
acquired
Number of 
targets
Number of 
targets over 
sales ($, 
Billion)
% of targets 
absorbed
Average 
patents per 
target
% of small 
acquisitions
Publications 
stock
Publications 
stock over 
sales ($,B) R&D stock
R&D stock 
over sales
Level of decentralization
Centralized 2,386 146.7 0.112 3.5 1.9 64.1 26.3 60.8 45.3 21.4 473.1 0.433
Hybrid  4,283 298.8 0.288 10.8 3.0 41.9 50.0 43.2 100.2 10.5 842.2 0.290
Decentralized 3,559 76.8 0.867 12.6 5.3 21.3 49.6 37.1 14.7 6.6 260.3 0.210
All 3,410 174.3 0.421 10.6 3.1 35.9 46.7 43.3 57.6 12.2 553.2 0.302
Table 2. Organizational Structure, External Orientation, and Internal Research
Notes: This table examines the relationship between organizational structure, external orientation, and internal research. Firms are classified to decentralization categories according to tertiles of share patents 
assigned . Column 4 counts the number of patenting targets acquired by our sample firms. Column 5 reports the percentage of targets that were absorbed. Targets are classified as absorbed if they cease to 
operate as separate legal entities after the acquisition year. In Column 8, targets are classified as small if the number of patents owned by the target at the acquisition year is less or equal to 5 (1st quartile of the 
distribution of number of patents held by targets).
ResearchExternal orientation
Figure 2: Measures for external orientation vs. internal research across tertiles of decentralization
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Share of patents acquired (left axis: percent)
Publications stock per sales (right axis: publications/$1Bn)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Dependent variable:
Dummy for Decentralized 0.75** 0.75** -0.48** -0.47** -0.39** -0.27** -0.27** -0.48** -0.42** -0.73** -0.74** -0.23** -0.15
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.09) (0.10)
Dummy for Hybrid 0.17** 0.16** -0.23** -0.22** -0.16** -0.19** -0.19** 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10)
Dummy for Centralized (base)
Publications intensity -0.05* 0.03** 0.04** -0.02
(0.28) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Share patents acquired -0.14 0.03 -0.20**
(0.12) (0.15) (0.09)
Share of small acquisitions 0.25**
(0.04)
ln(Sales )t-1 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.43** 0.43** 0.78** 0.78** 0.22** 0.22**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(R&D Stock )t-1 -0.72** -0.72**
(0.03) (0.03)
Four-digit SIC dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.23 0.24 0.51 0.51 0.71 0.71 0.80 0.80
Observations 11,304 11,304 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 11,304 11,304 11,304 11,304 11,304 11,304
Notes: This table examines the relationship between external orientation, internal research and organizational structure. Decentralization dummies are based  tertiles of share patents 
assigned . The unit of observation is firm-year. Publications intensity  is publications stock  over sales . Share targets absorbed  (Columns 3-5) divides the number of absorbed targets by 
the total number of targets. It classifies an acquisition as absorbed if it ceases to operate as a separate legal entity after the acquisition year. Share of small acquisitions  (Columns 6 and 7) 
divides the number of small targets by total number of targets. Targets are classified as small if the number of patents owned by the target at the acquisition year is less or equal to 5 (1st 
quartile of the distribution of number of patents held by affiliates). Patent propensity  (Columns 12 and 13) is the annual number of granted patents divided by R&D stock. Standard errors 
are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. **, * denote significance levels of 1 and 5 percent, respectively.
Patent propensity
Table 3. How External Orientation and Internal Research are Related to Organizational Structure
Share targets absorbed
Share patents 
acquired
Share of small 
acquisitions
Publications 
stock R&D stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES
Centraliz-
ed Hybrid  
Decentral-
ized
Centraliz-
ed Hybrid  
Decentral-
ized
ln(R&D Stock )t -1 0.11** 0.09** 0.09** 0.16** 0.06* 0.07** 0.13** 0.04 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Patents Stock )t-1 0.08**
(0.02)
ln(External  Patents Stock )t-1 0.08** 0.03 0.08** 0.08** 0.04 0.06** 0.05
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
ln(Internal  Patents Stock )t-1 0.07** 0.09* 0.04* 0.08** 0.09* 0.03 0.07**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Assets )t-1 0.81** 0.79** 0.78** 0.66** 0.80** 0.80** 0.36** 0.35** 0.42**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
ln(Sales )t-1 0.35** 0.55** 0.50**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Sales Growth 0.55** 1.19** 0.99**
(0.11) (0.15) (0.11)
Four-digit SIC dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.89
Observations 11,304 11,304 11,304 3,033 4,584 3,687 3,033 4,584 3,687
Notes: This table examines the relationship between firm market value, R&D, external orientation, and organizational structure. External 
patents are those obtained through acquisitions. Internal patents are those generated by internal divisions. Level of decentralization is based 
on tertiles of share patents assigned . Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through 
clustering by firms. **,  * denote significance levels of 1 and 5 percent, respectively.
Dependent variable: ln(Market Value )
Table 4. Market Value Estimation: Contributions From Internal and External Research Across Varying 
Organizational Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
ln(R&D Stock )t -1 0.16* 0.05** -0.01 0.21** 0.14** 0.13** 0.09* 0.05** 0.01 0.33** 0.08** 0.13**
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Patents Stock )t-1
ln(External  Patents Stock )t-1 0.03 0.11** 0.05** 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.10** 0.10** 0.00 0.10 0.06
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Internal  Patents Stock )t-1 -0.01 0.06** 0.04* 0.11** -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.06** 0.10** 0.17** 0.00 0.06
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Assets )t-1 0.80** 0.80** 0.78** 0.67** 0.57** 0.69** 0.52** 0.70** 0.70** 0.40** 0.68** 0.67**
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Sales Growth 0.32** 1.26** 0.82** 0.50** 0.81** 0.58** 0.22** 1.01** 0.60** 0.43** 1.04** 0.75**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.12)
Four-digit SIC dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.88 0.86 0.91 0.76 0.81 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.61 0.63 0.66
Observations 1,213 2,899 1507 1,820 1,678 2,175 1,289 2,770 1,968 1,744 1,813 1,714
Notes: This table examines how the market value results vary by firm technological diversity and size. Firms are classified as having low or high technological diversity 
according to the sample median value of the number of three-digit technology classes the firm patents in. Level of decentralization is based on tertiles of share patents 
assigned . Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. **,  * denote significance levels of 1 and 5 percent, respectively.
Table 5. Firm Market Value: Diversity and Size
Dependent variable: ln(Market Value )
Below-median sales
Share patents assigned
Above-median sales
Share patents assigned
High technological diversity Low technological diversity
Share patents assigned Share patents assigned
